



PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY OF NEW ENGLAND, EAST

PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND, EAST, INC.

NEWSLETTER

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EDITOR'S NOTE

At the May 21 PINE faculty meeting, Paul Schwaber presented a work in progress, "On the Death Instinct and Creativity," reported on in this issue by Sarah Ackerman. During the general discussion of this paper, Dr. Schwaber emphasized that, whether or not the concept of the death instinct is considered valid, it is incumbent on us as analysts to grapple with the reality of ubiquitous war and devastation inflicted by human beings on other human beings. The aggressive drive is insufficient, by itself, for understanding the scope of destruction our species visits on itself.

The question of the death instinct is not pursued further in this issue of the Newsletter. However, several articles relate to the problem of human destructiveness and our efforts to manage it. Clinton van der Walt's article on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission inquires into whether the Commission's twin goals were compatible. Did the need for reconciliation edge out the quest for truth and at what cost? ("These past weeks have been devastating for all South Africans who believed that we could build a country free from the degrading and dehumanizing impact of our apartheid past," writes a colleague from Johannesburg,

where violence against immigrants, including asylum seekers, has been underway for two weeks.) Narendra Keval's article on racism in South Africa – and in England -- concerns destructiveness, as, implicitly, does Henry Smith's paper questioning the utility of the concept of forgiveness in psychoanalysis. The articles by Gary Goldsmith and Jessica Boyatt do not pertain directly to these concerns. It is, however, impossible to consider the development of psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe without reference to the history of aggressiveness – and the manifestation of the death

instinct? – in that part of the world.

On to Eros. In the Fall 2007 Newsletter, we featured a call for articles about the experiences of falling in love and being in love, memory-laden transference phenomena par excellence. The most direct responses were too personal to be published but were very moving. One was an account of an analyst's erotic transference to her analyst. The other was an email in which the author, inspired by the Editor's Note, confided details of her marriage and of her love affairs outside her

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marriage. The editorial invitation had evoked significant memories and feelings in these correspondents and the desire to share them.

Submissions touching on erotic love, whatever its aim or object, are welcome. Several weeks ago, for instance, I received an email in which the writer's associations led him from a comparison of Brooklyn subway lines aboveground. While he did not take his thoughts particularly seriously, in my view, the final paragraph of the email reads like an expression of intense love and we are publishing it as such. "...The best single line I ever read is in Lowry's *Under the Volcano*, where you are looking at a thin silver line cross the distant horizon. It is a train.

Nowadays, my sheerest delight is standing on the platform in Penn. Station as a train enters. It reminds me of standing on the platform as a boy after school waiting for the commuter train and watching the big trains pull through to change engines. First, the rather tacky Commodore Vanderbilt and then the gorgeous Twentieth Century Limited with all the fancy people behind the glass windows in the parlor cars having drinks... They would take electric engines off, put on two huge coal-fired engines and then, with a tremendous noise of clanging bells, whistles and exploding boilers, begin the run flat out along the Hudson to Chicago. Always seemed to me the grandest moment in the day."

Ab Ovo

Beak gumming my entrails,
wings elbowing my temples,
there's this bird wants out.

Suppose I just let crack,
and he rolls out the red neck,
gets balanced on one foot?

I mean, he'll be all moist,
liquid-tongued, not voiced,
with wattles on his throat.

Honey, in a word,
this hotshot, headlong bird
Love is a strange coot.

George Starbuck



Psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe

In 2005, this Newsletter published Gary Goldsmith's "Shuttle Analysis in Boston," discussing the development of psychoanalysis in Russia and how training analyses are conducted for Russian trainees. In view of the curiosity expressed by many members of the PINE community concerning Dr. Goldsmith's more recent work, we asked him to describe the history and current activity of the IPA in Eastern Europe.

Imagine a psychoanalytic institute whose candidates speak fifteen different languages and live thousands of miles apart, have analysts and supervisors in distant countries, and have classes that meet for a week at a time. This is the Han-Groen Prakken Psychoanalytic Institute of Eastern Europe (PIEE). The natural question is: How is it all done?

PIEE was formalized as an IPA institute in 2002. It is the product of the energetic teaching activities conducted by many Western analytic groups (including the American) in Eastern Europe and Russia since the late 80's. These outreach efforts received new impetus from the dramatic political changes after the revolutions in Eastern Europe and

the fall of Communism. The institute, rising from this background, is unusual in many respects, not least of which is that it represents a new kind of training program with a new teaching format. It is also the first one to be directly sponsored by the IPA, not allied with any society or national analytic association.

The Dutch analyst Han Groen-Prakken, after serving as President of the European Psychoanalytic Federation (EPF) and spearheading efforts for rapprochement with Easterners interested in psychoanalysis (and against considerable resistance from many Western member societies), took over the EPF's East European Committee in 1991 and worked with John Kafka, Vice President of the IPA and head of its own East European Committee. Their teamwork gave vigor to a project that had been languishing until then, due partly to Western resistance. The reasons given (as recalled by Tamara Stajner-Popovic, PIEE Board Member from Belgrade) were that "Easterners were far behind the well-developed educational structures of Western societies, which was completely

Gary N. Goldsmith, M.D.

true. We were told that due to our complete isolation our analytic knowledge was backward -- which was partially true. And we were told that for 'given' reasons it was evident that there was no potential for the development of analysis in Eastern Europe -- which would be shown to be completely false." This was countered with arguments by Dr. Stajner-Popovic for "not writing off half of the European continent" with non-analytic rationalizations, presuming that the West could "know the unknown," which they had not even seen. The Committee was won over, and they decided to "go and see," starting with a visit to Belgrade.

Groen-Prakken and Kafka perceived the hunger for analysis, made many more contacts, and were remarkably sensitive to the cultural factors involved in bringing Western leaders to narcissistically vulnerable, at times traumatized, Eastern colleagues. A number of EPF seminars were then organized from 1989 on, in Budapest, Belgrade, Vienna, Vilnius and elsewhere. The cooperative work between IPA and EPF led later to conferences

in Moscow, Slovenia, Berlin, Kiev and Prague. The rapprochement was successful, and a regular series of summer schools began in 1994, the inaugural one taking place in Estonia. This was the cornerstone of a new format for teaching analysis in places where it had been suppressed, and where access to supervision and training analysis was non-existent. Our fifteenth summer school will soon take place in Odessa, in the second week of June. The students pay a fee that is subsidized by a budget provided by the IPA and the EPF, with contributions from the German and Italian analytic societies.

There are now two other schools organized yearly by the institute. One is a "Members' and Candidates' Seminar" held annually in February, rotating the locale each year or two. And there is a "Child and Adolescent Psychoanalytic School," which meets every October in Croatia. The summer school accepts psychotherapy trainees before they are admitted as candidates, and focuses on its outreach function, to provide less experienced therapists with a solid introduction to psychoanalysis and the psychodynamic model. Typically there are about one hundred and fifteen students and fifteen to twenty faculty. The Candidates' school customarily has about half that number of participants. It is hard to describe these schools without employing superlatives regarding the students' energy, and without relating stories of the individual sacrifices they make in order to be able to pursue analytic training. These are rich experiences for the students, who sometimes travel by car or train for two or three days to arrive, dealing with visa problems, lengthy (and often tense) border crossings, etc. We live and work in close quarters, taking over almost an entire hotel, sharing all our meals. There is a plenary lecture every morning, with discussion groups afterward, similarly-composed small groups for clinical discussions in the afternoons, an evening

film discussion group and/or evening workshops on aspects of the school's theme for the week, and individual supervision that goes on before, during and after these activities, from 7 in the morning to 11 at night. In addition there is the administrative work of the institute, such as Board meetings, discussion of admission interviews, planning and organizational meetings, requests for advice and consultation, discussions about needs for financial assistance, etc. The hunger is palpable, the enthusiasm inspiring. Students from about twenty Eastern countries have attended. Many of them at first were as foreign to one another as they were to Westerners, owing to the far-flung geographical reach, from the Baltic to the Caucasus, from the Balkans to Central Asia and Siberia. The chances for students to meet one another is only one of the secondary benefits of this training. I recall at the first school I attended, outside Riga, when one of the local Baltic students was troubled in finding out that his roommate was Russian (from the country of the "occupiers.") They made the surprising discovery that each was a human being, and that they shared common interests to boot. Although in one sense this is only to be expected, it is still surprising how many layers of distrust and distortion about these matters existed among countries that Westerners may simply have grouped together as more or less uniform, all members of the FSU or at least subject to Soviet hegemony. But each country has its own culture, language, history (including *psychoanalytic* history), which varies even inside the borders of each one.

One example of potential cultural misunderstanding and the role of our varied histories, occurred during one of the first summer schools I attended, in Sinaia, Romania. The Board considered that it was only fair and proper to ask the students for feedback on our pedagogic skills, as well as those of the invited teachers. The proposal was presented at a meeting of all the students and

faculty, with the suggestion that an anonymous brief written evaluation would be appropriate, since many students appeared hesitant to give verbal feedback on their courses. The suggestion was met with an immediate outcry of protest, with the complaint that this was far too reminiscent of the political denunciations so common in the repressive Communist societies they had just recently been liberated from. This was a surprise, since it was the recipients of the evaluations (the teachers themselves) who were the ones asking for the feedback. (Talk about analytic institutes generating paranoia!) The proposal was dropped.

The feeling generated in our schools is unique in my experience of organized analysis. The chance for students and teachers to listen to the same presentations together daily, to sit in small groups that meet twice a day (with rotating faculty), to share meals and leisure time in a single venue -- all of this sustains a spirit of interest and collegiality that is a gift. This structure has done a lot to minimize the foreignness that could impede the learning experience. Engaging the foreignness as a task cognate with analytic inquiry is something that has helped all levels of participants. I've been lucky by virtue of speaking Russian to be able to communicate directly with everyone. The official language of the schools is English, but Russian is accepted as an alternative, given the predominance of Russian participants, so that many seminars are given twice, once in Russian and once in English. Nonetheless all the students are encouraged to learn at least one of the official languages of the IPA. Plenary papers are given in English but translated into Russian as well.

An early question regarding the potential for spreading analysis to Eastern Europe focused on the cultural and political instability in the post-Communist world. John Kafka has been eloquent in disputing the

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notion that political turmoil poses an obstacle to the “stability” needed for psychoanalytic institutions to develop, noting the similarities that could be seen “between the beginnings of psychoanalysis in Vienna and the new beginnings of psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe. The one thing that both situations have in common was that in both periods psychoanalysis developed during times of massive, rapid social change . . . it is clear that psychoanalysis never developed ‘in an average expectable environment.’” He has observed that “psychoanalysis develops optimally when the possibilities for broad social change and the possibilities for the expression of individual change have a good fit.” And he notes a historical counterpart to the skepticism that the rebirth of psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe encountered initially from leaders of Western analytic organizations: “In the Freud Archives in Washington there is a copy of the circular letter from the IPA written in 1923 by the Secretary of the IPA, Otto Rank. It states that ‘the professor [Freud] thinks that we should recognize the group in Moscow. Of course, they are terrible both personally and professionally, but at least we would have some control over them. They can’t possibly be any worse than the group in New York.’”

In the program of training, we have had to make use of “shuttle analysis” and “shuttle supervision,” in which candidates travel several times a year (depending on the distance) to another country for intensive periods of analysis, such as two sessions a day for three weeks at a time, for example. We have set a minimal standard for shuttle analysis of at least one hundred hours per year, though more is recommended. This situation led one candidate from Lithuania to observe that she was leading a “shuttle life,” cut off for lengthy periods from family and friends, and from her practice, spending time in analysis in a foreign city, with little to do between analytic sessions.

The less than ideal circumstances for training candidates, such as the lack of training analysts in Russia and most countries of the East, made shuttle analysis and other modifications a necessity, as we have striven to develop psychoanalysis in previously unserved areas. We have been very attentive to the potential charge that analysts trained in this way in the East could be considered as second rate by Western colleagues, and have worked vigorously to develop a training mechanism that is viable and of high quality. But until institutes develop in each country, we must confront the realities that impose limitations on standard training. By my account, there is little if any difference to be discerned between graduates of Western institutes and graduates of PIEE. Where the program may involve fewer hours, and more hardships in completing training analysis (if they even succeed in finding an analyst who speaks the same language), individual aptitude and initiative more than make up for the shortage of resources. I’ve completed two analyses with Russian candidates, and despite certain frustrations caused by the improvised setting, I am convinced that analytic work can be done effectively this way.

Importantly, the viability of such an educational program depends on the initiative of the individual candidates, since it is impossible to meet with the same frequency that candidates in Western institutes are able to have for their seminars. As a result, a focus was placed on the close evaluation of the candidates’ skills at the conclusion of training, understanding the need for flexibility in the path taken to gain those skills. All are encouraged to make use of available resources, attend local meetings, both didactic and clinical, that are organized among themselves, to attend talks of visiting analysts, international conferences, etc. But the schools of the PIEE remain the favored setting

for all.

The popularity of the schools is betokened by the fact that after graduation, many former candidates have asked to return, and have been welcomed. We had to change the name to Members’ and Candidates’ Seminars to reflect this altered composition. What they said was, “*This is our institute.*” They did not want to give up the affiliation. It will be interesting to see whether the schools become the seed of future independently-organized Eastern analytic meetings, as it appears may happen. Apart from the schools, most candidates do not have opportunities to meet with other Easterners. This may reflect the residue of a feeling that ultimate legitimacy still comes from contacts with the West.

In addition to the schools, several smaller programs have developed, in which the teaching of analytic theory is emphasized, in recognition of gaps in training that inevitably occur. The first of these was the Amsterdam program, taking a class of about fifteen trainees for four long weekends per year, for four years. That program is now ending; no new classes will be accepted. There was also a similar program in Helsinki, for candidates from St. Petersburg and the Baltic countries, which is also ending. Two years ago we started a program called TSR (Theoretical Seminars in Russian Language), which is beginning its third year in June. These seminars, based on the same syllabus as the program in Amsterdam, are unique in that they are given exclusively in Russian, four weekends per year. Each of the three organizers attends two of the schools; all of us are present together for at least one of them. We invite other teachers each time, who have a special interest in the particular subjects to be taught, in order to supplement the skills of the three permanent staff members (Paolo Fonda (Trieste), Eike Hinze (Berlin), and myself), and share the

teaching responsibilities. We will be adding a Russian member soon. Written work is required every year, beyond the case write-ups that are standard for all analytic trainees. The seminar is popular; we are starting our second group of trainees in June 2009. This training goes hand in hand with the PIEE training, and we try when possible to piggy-back the schools to cut down on travel time and expense.

The Board of the PIEE is composed of eight members. We are also the staff of all of the committees -- admissions, progressions, program, ethics, education, curriculum, bylaws. There is also the task of arranging for the school sites, with the help of local candidates, who propose their city as the venue for a school. We also serve as the Mentors for all of the candidates, who must choose among us for the purpose of following up on their reading, attendance at analytic events, discussing any and all questions about training, and providing a conduit to the Board. Doing all of this work is a task -- I can't imagine how it would have been possible without modern methods of rapid communication. But the question may well arise, what prevents this one small group from behaving monopolistically, since it alone is charged with so many functions? Surprisingly, this problem seems never to have surfaced. I believe that it is because our own group function is an analogue to the multicultural background of the candidates. Importantly, we are not just from eight different countries and national cultural traditions, East and West, but we are also from eight differing *analytic* cultures. The eight countries are Italy, France, Germany, Hungary, Serbia, Finland, Holland and the U.S. (Soon the Dutch member will leave, and we will have our first Board member who is himself a product of the training, from Moscow.) Our discussions are vigorous, compromise is necessary, but it is enlightening to learn of

the different ways other analytic societies have coped with the same problems. All of us are faculty members at our home institutes, in addition to PIEE.

Our official function in each country is different. Candidates must defer to local laws for licensure in their own country, obviously varying from place to place. So far, the advent of organized analysis in these countries has been too far under officialdom's radar to generate much controversy. The more recent and greater problem is the internecine conflict that arises in different cities when several candidates from one city are all PIEE members, but are in organizational conflict. We have moved to expand our role to include advising new members and candidates of the need for smooth functioning of their local groups, as a way to ease the transition to eventual Study Group status. By focusing on the need for cohesion, especially for creating an environment that will be hospitable to future candidates in their own Study Groups and Institutes, we hope to be able to minimize potentially larger problems, while we still have leverage. This additional feature of our work was an outgrowth of the experience in Moscow, where for the first time two groups were simultaneously granted Study Group status by the IPA. In essence, they trumped all the other cities in which there have been splits -- they had a split even *before* they had an institute. The East is an interesting place.

We have already graduated about a dozen candidates, who are now *Direct* Members of the IPA (i.e., members who as of the present do not have national analytic societies of which they can be members). Besides Moscow, several IPA Study Groups have already been formed by PIEE graduates in different cities, a stage on the way to becoming full IPA institutes. In Latin America, a similar virtual institute has been organized, the Instituto Latinoamericano de

Psicoanalysis (ILAP). It is directly based on the model of PIEE, and we have already had some initial exchanges of faculty.

IPA is not the only analytic presence in Eastern Europe, Russia and the FSU. There are competing groups, most pronouncedly in Ukraine and Russia, promising all sorts of wondrous analytic cures, including removal of the evil eye. They falsely claim links to the IPA, which won't do our reputation any great service. On the other hand, the existence of such claims of IPA connection may also be a good sign, if it concedes that this is a trademark conferring legitimacy in training and skills. It is not our purpose (nor are we able) to compete with such groups of wild analysts (not in Freud's limited sense of the word -- they are truly "wild"!); but we do hope that our candidates and members, practicing with humble skill and an ethic of responsibility to the pursuit of individual freedom enhanced by analysis, will make their mark with time, and come to be seen as the true (new) keepers of the flame. We have chosen to focus on quality rather than quantity, so that the designation "IPA analyst" carries meaning.

As a phenomenon, the growth of analytic interest in the East testifies to the weight of political repression suffered beforehand. Analysis is seen as one of the areas of emotional and intellectual discovery and professional work most consistent with the goals of the revolutions of eighteen years ago -- to restore the chance for personal freedom and respect for the individual, as against the hypocritical slogans proclaiming allegiance to the welfare of the collective. Freedom of thought is a powerful motivator, and a humane one. Evidence of this is inherent in the enthusiasm with which Easterners have sought their education in analysis. That many of them are conscious of being in the vanguard of a new generation

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of psychoanalysis in their countries, adds color to these ventures.

The future for PIEE looks interesting. It is an institute that looks towards its own dissolution, as local analytic groups are formed, move away from the PIEE's aegis, and take on the task of propagating analysis in their home cities and countries. This is still a few years away, as many pre-candidates and candidates are still in the midst of their training. Further, a surge of interest in other cities,

some even farther East (Almaty, Irkutsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Kishinev) makes its continued operation necessary for the foreseeable future.

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Leaning in to the Relational Synapse

Connecting mirror neuron research and relational psychoanalytic thinking

"Humanity...is to be found neither in one of the two partners, nor in both together, but only in the dialogue itself, in the 'between' which they live together,"

—Martin Buber, 1958

The term "in-between" is somewhat pedestrian; what happens in the space between one thing and another is often neglected, the assumption being that there is nothing there, that it is empty. However, as mirror neuron research would suggest, when this gap fills with the communicative actions of each participant, empty space becomes experience. It is then that the elements and processes that comprise "in-between" space become critical to the structure and function of the phenomena on either side of it. I conceptualize the space "in-between" two people as a potential source of power that can spiral towards psychopathology or psychological health on both a neuronal and relational level. Casting the discussion of "in-between space" within the framework of complex adaptive systems suggests that under 'good enough' conditions in both development and therapy our minds, brains and relational experience, and all the variations of "in-between" space within and among them, will move towards greater flexibility and complexity engendering experiences of psychological health.

Mirror Neurons

Mirror neurons were discovered in 1996 by a group of neuroscientists at the university of Parma in Italy who were studying the pre-motor cortex in macaque monkeys (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The researchers were directly recording activity in single neurons in the macaque monkey brain during a variety of experimental conditions involving motor planning and activity. On a summer day, a researcher walked into the lab licking an ice cream cone¹. The machine that recorded neural activity began to whirl, indicating that the monkey's pre-motor neuron was firing. However, the monkey was not doing anything besides watching the researcher lick his gelato. When the researcher stopped licking, the machine stopped whirring. When the researcher started licking the machine started whirring again. These neurons were dubbed mirror neurons because they were found to fire in similar intensity and pattern when an individual actually performs an action or simply observes an action. From this chance interaction, a new area of research has emerged

¹ The veracity of this story has been questioned. I recently (12/07) heard Dr. Regina Pally, who is in a neuroscience/psychoanalysis study group with Siegel, Iacoboni, Gabbard and Cozolino, confirm its truth. However, whether true or not, it illustrates the point well.

Jessica Boyatt, Psy.D.

to study these neurons directly in monkeys and indirectly humans.

The discovery of mirror neurons has redefined a number of assumptions about how the brain's perceptual, cognitive and motor processes function, both for monkeys and humans. Rather than understanding these processes to be essentially separate and linear (perception leads to thinking which leads to action), the work on mirror neurons argues in favor of a brain that inherently processes information in a complex, interrelated and dynamic manner that makes meaning of information on multiple levels simultaneously. As Rizzolatti (2008) states,

The rigid divide between perceptive, motor, and cognitive processes is to a great extent artificial; not only does perception appear to be embedded in the dynamics of action, becoming much more composite than used to be thought in the past, but *the acting brain* is also and above all *a brain that understands*. (p. xi. Italics in original)

Mirror neurons in humans seem to have a wider distribution throughout the brain, are triggered under a larger variety of circumstances (human mirror neurons activate during

intransitive as well as transitive actions) and are critical to the human ability to learn through imitation². Mirror neurons in humans are thought to exist in the pre-motor area of the brain (which includes Broca's area, the area of the brain thought to be most involved with expressive speech) and have direct links to the primary motor cortex (overt muscle movement) as well as cortices in the temporal (recognition and naming of observed action), parietal (somatic sensation and spatial mapping) and pre-frontal (executive functions) lobes as well as in the insula (facial recognition), amygdala (emotional arousal) and other limbic structures thought to be involved with intention and memory (Cozolino, 2006; Pally, 2005).

It is important to note that there is a lack of clarity about how to refer to areas of the brain that appear to be directly linked to mirror neuron activity but are not motor neurons and cannot therefore, appropriately be referred to as mirror neurons. Siegel addresses this issue by using the term "resonance circuit" to describe the complex multi-sensory (visual, auditory, olfactory) properties of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) that are directly linked to mirror neuron circuits in the parietal and inferior frontal regions (Siegel, 2007). While it does seem important to be as clear as possible in our language, to date, much of the research on mirror neurons uses the term "mirror neuron system"

² One question often asked about mirror neurons is why these neurons in the pre-motor cortex that fire upon doing an action do not cause movement when they fire upon observing an action being done by another. While we are all familiar with the phenomenon of nonconsciously mimicking a facial expression we observe, there have also been experiments (Iacoboni, 1999) providing electrophysiological evidence of nonconscious sub-threshold facial movements on observation of emotion expression without any overt imitation. Additionally, in a 2001 study, Baldissera found that when observing an action, spinal cord neuronal excitability is the opposite of cortical neuronal excitability as it varies with visual input. Rizzolatti (2004) states that "...in the spinal cord there is an inhibitory mechanism that prevents the execution of an observed action, thus leaving the cortical motor system free to 'react' to that action without the risk of overt movement generated" (p.175).

to refer to circuits of neurons that both do and do not have motor properties.

One critical aspect of the human mirror neuron system currently being studied is how intention is derived by observing another's motor acts. When thinking about this it is important to keep two things in mind. The first is that "motor acts" include large obvious movements such as lifting your arm as well as fleeting nonconscious movements, such as the microsecond twitch of a facial muscle in an emotion expression that is sent and received entirely below the threshold of consciousness.

The second thing to be aware of is that there are different levels of meaning making that flow from mirror neuron resonance. On the level of mirror neuron activation, intention understanding represents an ability to motorically resonate with another's observed actions. In other words, an individual's own motor repertoire is the dictionary of potential meanings through which another's actions are initially automatically and nonconsciously understood. However, this initial level of meaning making appears, for humans, to be instantly plugged into multiple layers of more complex, experience mediated, conscious and nonconscious "dictionaries" by the observing individual.

For example, if a twelve year old sees a snake stick out its tongue, she will understand that action on a visual basis that then connects to her semantic knowledge of what a 'snake tongue' is and does. There would be no mirror neuron motor resonance in the twelve year old. However, if she sees a friend stick out his tongue the mirror neurons in her pre-motor cortex and their resonance circuits in the orbital frontal cortex, insula and limbic areas activate because she has her own experience sticking out her tongue and she can call up a plethora of meanings, both body based and verbally symbolized, for this action.

The Relational Synapse

A core theoretical construct that has emerged from thinking about the dialogic origin of mind and brain is what I call the relational synapse³. The relational synapse describes the physical and experiential space in-between two people when they engage each other in relationship. It is culturally and contextually determined (think "crowded" on a bus in Mexico vs. Germany or the social space "bubble" at a business meeting vs. a dance party). The relational synapse is also the location of emergent, co-created relational phenomena. These emergent phenomena are then recursively folded in to each individual's internal and interpersonal experience, as internalized paradigms of self, other and relationship as well as in vivo relational expectancies. As such, these paradigms and expectancies become both cause and consequence of further conscious and nonconscious, intrapsychic and interpersonal communication.

While explicit, conscious verbal articulation is the tip of the iceberg we are most aware of experiencing in the relational synapse, implicit, nonconscious communication is the vast reservoir of experience that determines its texture and accessibility. It is important to highlight that both nonverbal and verbal communication can be conscious (spoken words, intentional touch) and nonconscious (prosody, unintentional facial expression). While explicit, conscious communication always contains elements of implicit communication, implicit, nonconscious communication does not always go hand in hand with explicit, conscious communication.

Languaging Mirror Neuron Resonance

An important corollary to the

³ While this project focuses on dyadic interaction, one could use this concept of the relational space "in-between" people to talk about the larger social synapses through which groups of people communicate, in recursive and mutually influencing ways along racial, economic and cultural lines.

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concept of relational synapse is the idea of “linguaging” one’s experience in that relational space. While I generally like to be conservative in my manipulation of English, I have decided that turning the noun language into a verb in this instance is the best way to describe the process of crystallizing one’s experience in the relational synapse into more knowable phenomena. Linguaging one’s experience in the relational synapse involves a great deal more than using words to describe an experience. It involves multiple levels of meaning making that exist on a continuum from nonconscious to conscious and that often occur simultaneously. The relational synapse results in a perpetual and automatic flow of nonconscious and conscious information about our interpersonal and intrapsychic experience. The information flows on nonconscious visceral, emotional and imagistic levels as well as consciously felt, thought and/or verbally articulated levels. We also make meaning out of this information on all these levels.

The process of linguaging one’s experience in the relational synapse can be thought of as both the implicit and explicit ways we make meaning of that experience. Of course, most of the implicit linguaging occurs much faster and with greater complexity than our conscious minds could possibly hold. Indeed, in “good enough” circumstances these multilayered meaning making processes remain comfortably out of awareness and contribute adaptively to a satisfying life. However, in the therapeutic situation, when there are aspects of a patient’s experience in the relational synapse that are too threatening to fully language (e.g. any possibility of emotional intimacy induces dissociation) or are linguaged in ways that do not fit the current context (e.g., emotional intimacy automatically begets intense anxiety), attending more closely to the visceral, emotional, and imagistic aspects of how each member of the dyad linguages his or

her experience can be mutative.

Projective Identification in the context of mirror neuron research

While I have elaborated a number of contemporary relational psychoanalytic concepts in the context of current empirical research on the human mirror neuron system elsewhere,⁴ I will focus here on using the construct of the relational synapse and the corollary idea of linguaging one’s implicit experience in that relational space as a way of redefining projective identification. The concept of projective identification is discussed as necessarily bi-directional and expanded to explore its non-pathological (and in people with intact mirror neuron systems, inevitable) aspects as a form of human communication.

It has always seemed difficult, when discussing projective identification, to operationalize the concept. How does one person “put feelings into” another person? In light of our growing knowledge of how mirror neurons and their resonance circuits work, it may be more accurate to say that the “foreign feeling” that has been described as the herald of projective identification may originate in the therapist’s linguaging of her mirror neuron resonance with the patient’s implicit communication. It may not be that the patient puts her feelings into the therapist, but that the therapist automatically and internally uses her mirror neurons to simulate the patient’s implicit narrative, i.e., the motoric, sub-symbolic signifiers of the patient’s feelings such as facial expression, prosody, posture, gaze. In other words, while the observed behavior that sparks the therapist’s response is exogenous, the feeling the therapist has and the implicit narratives it triggers in her are endogenous. The therapist may realize that the ‘as if’ feelings

⁴ This article is derived from a doctoral dissertation which discusses Bromberg’s ideas about dissociation, Ogden’s idea of the analytic third and Benjamin’s ideas about recognition and intersubjectivity within this context of mirror neuron research, infant research and attachment theory.

that arise through linguaging this resonance are dissonant with what she might feel based on the patient’s explicit communication.

Of course, because therapists are not the only humans in possession of mirror neurons, the patient is also perpetually and inevitably involved in a process of mirror neuron resonance, embodied simulation (Gallese, 2007) and linguaging of the therapist’s implicit communication. How these bi-directional implicit communications become linguaged for each member of the dyad and how curiously the resultant meanings can be explored in the relational space between them will impact how well they become understood and integrated both implicitly and explicitly. While this process is mutual it is also (to varying degrees) asymmetrical because retaining the therapeutic frame and working towards change that is useful to the patient is incumbent on the therapist.

Projective identification may be a defense but it also seems possible that it is a crucial (and, in neurotypical individuals, unstoppable) way of communicating around, over and through other defense mechanisms. For example, a patient may be intellectualizing about how unnecessary feelings are to a fulfilled life, while his facial expression, gestures, prosody and body posture are communicating a different implicit narrative. Upon observation of this implicit narrative, the therapist’s mirror neurons and resonance circuits activate networks in her brain that create the ‘feeling of what happens’ (Damasio, 1999) as if she were executing the facial expressions, gestures, body postures and tone of voice of her patient. Perhaps when she holds her body, face and voice in that way, she feels sad and desperate.

This may feel like a ‘foreign intrusion’ because the feelings induced by the observation of the patient’s implicit narrative are

dissonant with the way the therapist is actually holding her face, body and voice in the moment. However, if she can language the 'feeling of what happens' while her mirror neurons resonate with the patient's implicit narrative in the service of the patient's issues, she will gain understanding of the patient's affective reality and relational conflicts and be better able to engage the relational synapse in ways that make it more likely that the patient gains greater access to himself.

This process must also, by definition, work in the other direction. The patient's mirror neurons will resonate with the therapist's implicit narrative. Perhaps when the analyst implicitly communicates acceptance, authentic liking and genuine curiosity, it activates those feelings in the patient in a dissonant way. This process would be equally true of negative feelings the therapist brings to the relational synapse (anxiety, hostility, rage, envy). It may produce considerable dissonance for the patient to 'pick up' on complex implicit communications from the analyst that include both positive and negative feelings towards him in a potentially intimate relational environment that can survive and grow in the face of ambivalent feelings. It is both in living this experience and working through it that the brain/mind/self changes and new experience in the relational synapse becomes possible.

For example, perhaps the patient will furiously defend against the possibility of being known and loved on one level (perhaps this could be the dynamic unconscious), while actually living the experience of it on another level (we might call this the implicit nonconscious). Over time, this process will broaden the patient's (as well as the therapist's) range of responses within the relational synapse and hone both participants ability to language, verbally articulate and ultimately integrate what they make and find there. Perhaps this nonconscious dissonance that works bi-directionally between therapist and patient and how it becomes

language by each, both viscerally and verbally, combine to create the seat of therapeutic action for the patient and the gift of personal growth for the therapist.

Conclusion

Research on the mirror neuron system in humans and nonhuman primates has underscored the centrality of implicit communicative processes in the relational synapse and the inextricable necessity of brain, mind and relationship in the experience of being human. This research supports the idea that engaging in the relational synapse is foundational to the human experience. Indeed, Lyons-Ruth (Lyons-Ruth, 2006) conceptualizes the human capacity for engaging another's mind as a condition of our humanity and as an essential function of mind.

We could not voluntarily inhibit the development and functioning of our awareness of other minds any more that we could voluntarily inhibit our capacity for abstraction. I would not view intersubjectivity as a goal-corrected motivational system that becomes activated under certain conditions and deactivated under others. Instead, I would view intersubjectivity as a parameter of human mental functioning that cannot be deactivated (p. 600).

Nonetheless, there are clearly a variety of ways humans amplify, ignore or covet more of this capacity given their neurobiological makeup, the relational soup in which they find themselves and the interaction of the two. Change is often sought when one's established modus operandi in the relational synapse becomes less effective.

The past twenty years have brought profound changes in both psychoanalytic theorizing as well as methods for understanding brain function. These changes have paved the way to a more integrated, multidisciplinary

approach to understanding how mind, brain and relationship interact to create human experience. In creating theoretical bridges between mirror neuron research and contemporary relational psychoanalytic thought, it is crucial to emphasize the indispensability of the neurobiological and the psychological, the brain and the mind, in the dynamic, mutually influencing, and self organizing processes of becoming or coming undone through relationship. By making explicit connections between these two decidedly different phenomenological levels of understanding human experience, the hope is that new ways of conceptualizing optimal development and the mutative elements of the therapeutic situation will emerge and be studied in both experimental and clinical settings.

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Racism as Living Brutality

Narendra Keval

This paper was delivered by Narendra Keval on March 19, 2008 as part of a conference sponsored by The Trauma Centre for Survivors of Violence and Torture at the Capetonian Hotel in Cape Town, South Africa. The conference was entitled "Journey Through the Generations: Transgenerational Transmission of Trauma." The paper is followed by an email exchange between Mr. Keval and the editor discussing issues addressed in the paper.

When you land at the airport of Cape Town, South Africa, you can't help but notice the beautiful backdrop of the mountains and the scenery as you leave the airport terminal and head for the road, and then it hits you on both sides of the motorway – the legacy of brutalized living that was apartheid. Rows of corrugated iron shacks crammed together like any third world shanty town, piled on top of one another or side by side, spaces and lives demarcated along racial lines by historical circumstance. You are forced to notice this again when you head for the airport to leave.

When I drive to the university, I am struck by a whole array of images that stay with me: children playing in the school grounds with a back drop of broken windows of the building and heaps of rubbish surrounding the perimeter fencing, where people are sometimes seen rummaging through the trash or simply sitting on it looking aimlessly at their surroundings. Children run and dodge the cars across the motorway, targeting them at the traffic lights, either begging or selling. It is all predictable; I expect that they will be there tomorrow and the day after. They often don't get a second glance.

At the university, I am often struck by the fact that staff and students carry keys with them to lock the doors on leaving or on entering a room. It is almost like a ritual -- one which I have now joined. It reminds me of my days of working in a forensic hospital

with violent criminal patients, where we all carried keys that locked the doors of rooms we had entered before opening the next one in front. At lunch time, all the cutlery had to be counted before any patient left the canteen. Nobody gave it a second thought. We even joked about it to make things more manageable; the joking masked the fact that our security rituals involved vigilance rooted in our deep anxieties about our safety. We were afraid that an act of murder might take place anytime and that any one of us could be the casualty. We were in some small and silent, but significant, way brutalized and traumatized and this went some way toward explaining the number of brutal incidents that took place between patient and nursing staff and the extent of staff sickness.

What doesn't get a second glance hides the fact that the traumatizing agent has already seeped in and done its damage in a silent way so that brutalized living becomes the norm. This is most graphically and painfully the case in the most impoverished communities, but it is also present in our preoccupations and vigilance about safety in all the social spaces we inhabit in South Africa.

What apartheid did was to make people of color feel marginal, devalued or subhuman. Devaluing, debasing, humiliating or ignoring, forgetting, negating and spoiling is what racism is about. When the United Nations described apartheid as a crime against humanity, it was describing a criminal act with murderous intent. Apartheid and racism attempt to murder all the links or connections that make up our secure base, beginning with the mother-infant bond and moving to the symbolic world of language and culture – all that gives us a sense of security and comfort in our own skin. The puncture and fracture from racist assault can cause a confusion about

who one is and how one relates to self and others even when it appears as if everything is being managed well.

The assaulted individual must work through feelings of profound shame and humiliation. Painstakingly and slowly, the trauma must be integrated into the individual's identity. If it remains encapsulated as an alien experience, it continues to possess the potential for wreaking havoc to the individual if reawakened by either internal or external events. Mourning allows us to integrate these unthinkable experiences. It enables us to recover the capacity to use our aggression to be assertive and to protect ourselves from racism in the external world and from our own tendencies towards it. However, the process of mourning is complicated if anger and rage cannot be expressed directly to the perpetrator. When a regime or government is, itself, the perpetrator of racism, as in apartheid South Africa, the task of confronting the aggressor is made all the more difficult. When the normal avenue for expressing anger and rage is blocked, because of a fear of punishment, both real and imagined, the aggression gets re-directed towards the self or the community. However, in so doing it develops into what I call an *internal culture of brutality*. Malignant racism is taken into the self so that the individual becomes the perpetrator. One function of this may be a reversal or mitigation of feelings of powerlessness and an expression of legitimate feelings of entitlement and desire for compensation for all that has been irretrievably lost.

Clinical Example

Racist brutality internalized by the victims of racism can express itself through attitudes of moral superiority or through acts of revenge and racism toward individuals perceived to belong to a group that has shamed and humiliated its victims. Alternatively, it can be

directed towards one's own ethnic identity through self hatred. One instance of such a failure to mourn was brought to my attention quite dramatically in my work with a patient a number of years ago (Keval, 2001). He was a black Afro Caribbean man who told me quite casually in one session that he wanted to peel his black skin off to avoid what he felt was the daily hatred directed at him by white people. In exploring this with him, it became apparent that, whilst his conscious wish was to make his pain more tolerable by removing his black skin from the gaze of white people, in his unconscious life this wish was an act of murder. By cutting himself out of life he had become the very racist that he despised.

The story was complicated, as it usually is in our kind of work, by the fact that, in his childhood, his black father, who became psychotic, from time to time would try to wash the son's black skin in the mad hope that this would make the skin lighter. The father, too, had a history of being traumatized in many different ways, including suffering a racist attack by a gang of white youths, which resulted in a serious head injury. The patient's problem was that, internally, his grievance towards the white world also linked up with his father's racist hatred of him; he was trying to please his father, but it was a deadly pact. He was going to murder himself, his black self, to get his father's 'white' love and approval.

Internally, he found it difficult to extricate himself from this situation, as behind every racist encounter was the ghost of his father lurking in the background, a father whom he desperately needed for his own development but with whom he was caught up in a brutality which he acted out on his skin and other white authority figures until it escalated into criminality and then being incarcerated for terrorizing others in an armed bank robbery. It was only in the solitude of prison life that he began some soul searching and was fortunate enough to have had various

mentors who steered him towards further help when he left prison.

This was the bigger story behind his request for help with his racial identity. He was telling me he was not comfortable in his own skin. We have to remember that what the patient cannot recall or remember (Freud, 1914b), he is doomed to repeat and re-enact again and again until the story is heard, emotionally felt in the guts and understood by both the patient and therapist. Only then can it be integrated into the self, not cut out or peeled off. This patient repeated and therefore transmitted his intergenerational story by playing it out with me as he had experienced it himself.

This came out in a dramatic way in one session when he demanded to see a black therapist who he felt would understand him better. This was after he had come to the session agitated by the way two white ladies had clutched their handbags when passing him on the street. He was full of rage and felt that only black people could really understand the pain of being treated this way. In one sense, he was right, of course. In this moment, he just wanted to be in the concrete safety of a black person. He felt that the sense of being the same would give him a temporary sanctuary from what he felt was the subtle hatred of the outside world. In one sense, he was right, of course. But there was a twist to this story, which gradually emerged.

I wanted to explore with him what he felt that I, an Indian therapist, was failing to pick up that a black therapist would understand. He was having none of this. He felt that I was not suitable to help him simply by virtue of the fact of my not being black. The patient was affectively communicating to me that he had entered an area of his mind in which only absolute, concrete alternatives existed. A wish for certainty often follows in the wake of a traumatizing experience which throws the capacity to think more symbolically

(Garland, 1991) out the window, if only temporarily. At such moments, different viewpoints cannot co-exist. At the receiving end of this absolute conviction or certainty, I understood the experience of being stopped dead in one's tracks.

The patient was also issuing me a challenge: "Prove to me that you are good enough to help me." I thought he was getting me to experience what it felt like to have a skin color that was deemed inferior. He wanted to wash my brown skin off, just as his father wanted to wash his black skin off to make it lighter. This was the narcissistic wound he wanted me to experience. The racist attitude of his father was now in the patient coming out in the room with me. He was unconsciously identified with this brutality that made him want to peel his own black skin off. Only once this patient's story could be lived out and understood in the consulting room could his murderous attitude be contained with some hope of his being better able to manage it himself.

For the individual or for the community, becoming caught up with an internal culture of brutality puts well-being at risk. It can result in all sorts of recklessness regarding the self and others. This is particularly poignant in post apartheid South Africa where interpersonal violence has reached extremely disturbing levels. I wonder whether acts of criminality, which attempt to violate, steal and murder individuals' private spaces and boundaries, is an unconscious communication about how the traumatizing agency of apartheid was experienced internally and continues to repeat itself. The actors have changed and the details of the plot, but has the underlying script?

Irrespective of one's ethnicity or color of skin, the lived experience of race and racism is always present in subtle ways in the privacy of our daily thoughts, feelings, imaginations and

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dreams. Racism can be played out crudely, such as in the way our social spaces and communities have been arranged spatially and economically or in the most subtly destructive ways in relationships. If we are to be of use to our patients, we must provide space for them to come face to face with their internal culture of brutality, however painful a prospect this is for them and for us. What has often been overlooked is that such acceptance and exploration can make way for a benign increase of curiosity, a flourishing of the imagination in regard to the role of race as opposed to the traumatic need for absolute certainty and control.

Narendra Keval works for the United Kingdom Health Service and is in private practice. He trained and worked at the Tavistock Clinic. He has just completed two years as a Visiting Senior Lecturer at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.

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Email Exchange:

Dear Naz,

... I want to mention a conversation I had in Cape Town and a description my 21 year old daughter shared with me after I returned home. In SA, I was traveling with a group to which Ben, a "colored" driver was assigned. When Ben was a teenager, his family was displaced from District Six. I ended up having a number of conversations with him in which his efforts to look on the bright side -- he has a job, for instance -- were constantly in combat with lingering feelings of great bitterness. One morning, he spoke to me about how, when he was a little boy, his father was his hero. Then, when he became a teenager and his father was forced to accept the new housing the government allotted them, Ben ceased for a long time to respect him. Intellectually, he realized there was no alternative, but the image of his father as strong and indomitable was shattered. Sometime later, that same morning, without consciously connecting the two topics, he mentioned to me how, several years ago, a heartbreaking event had occurred to him. He owned, or at least had access to, two taxis and felt quite pleased at being his own boss. But then, his nine year old daughter's class were given as a school project to do presentations about their families. One day, Ben (very atypically) took the afternoon off and came home to take a nap. His daughter came home from school and his wife asked her how the presentation had gone. "OK," was her response. The mother pressed her and finally, unaware that her father was resting in the next room, she spoke about being embarrassed to mention that her father was a cab driver. He told me that at that moment, he burst into tears.

Ben's stories reminded me of Freud's account of his father telling him about how once he was on the street, nicely dressed, wearing a new

fur cap. "Up comes a Christian, who knocks my cap into the mud, and shouts, 'Jew, get off the pavement!'" Freud asked his father what he did then and his father calmly told him that he had simply gone into the street and picked up the cap. "That did not seem very heroic on the part of the big strong man who was leading me, a little fellow, by the hand." Ben's story also rang a bell with my daughter, when I reported it to her. Her roommate at college is from the Dominican Republic and very dark skinned. Once, she was driving with her father in Indiana. Police stopped the car for some trivial reason and were demanding, abusive, etc. The father, a big man known by his daughter for his assertiveness, meekly answered all their questions, showed all the documents demanded, etc. When his daughter asked why he had behaved this way, his response was, "We're in Indiana." Indiana is Klan territory....

Dear Frances,

... I found your account of your experience in South Africa very moving and interesting for a number of reasons. First I have noticed that the type of observations you made of your interactions are seldom made by fellow South Africans living here or if they make them, they are not talking openly about them which makes me think of what the societal silence around the issue of race is about. Secondly, the point you make about the link with Freud's experience is very interesting because of this sense of silence which seems to have pervaded psychoanalysis, as if something indigestible has gotten transmitted and repeated onto the realm of ethnicity and racism. I wonder if it is being enacted by the relative silence on the subject matter when it comes to grappling with it in the consulting room. Certainly there is, as you point out, much shame, embarrassment and humiliation to contend with....

Is Forgiveness a Useful Concept?

Open Scientific Meeting, April 5, 2008

Presenter: Henry F. Smith, M.D.
Discussants: Judy Kantrowitz, Ph.D. and Howard M. Katz, M.D.
Moderator: Fred Busch, Ph.D.
Reporter: Frances Lang, LICSW

Dr. Smith began his talk by noting that, in recent years, the concept of forgiveness has become popular in fields ranging from sociology, anthropology, and religion to psychoanalysis; it is widely regarded as a goal worth striving for. He observed, however, that the meaning of forgiveness – including its meaning across the world’s religions – is, itself, highly variable and that its utility as a psychoanalytic concept is not self evident. The concept may possess practical advantages for the survival of our species: “Following violent, often genocidal... social conflict, formalized rituals of atonement and reparation have been used in an effort to prevent further bloodshed and retaliation.” However, Smith questioned whether such rituals exemplified forgiveness in the sense in which it has been praised as a moral good or a psychoanalytic aim. Forgiveness, as a specific element of psychic growth, involving the relinquishment of rage and shame over wrongs inflicted, may be an impossible task. Forgetting an injury may be the closest humans can come to forgiving.

Smith suggested that, in psychoanalysis, the term “forgiveness” has evolved as a non-specific term used as if it denoted a specific process of change. From his point of view, the experience of forgiveness is the outcome, rather than an aspect, of the work of analysis and of psychic change. He cited Akhtar’s discussion (2002) of psychopathology involving forgiveness, but differed from him

regarding the expansion of the capacity for forgiveness as central to the work of mourning. Similarly, in discussing Lansky’s work on the dynamics of forgiveness (Lansky 2001,2005), Smith criticized Lansky’s overbroad use of the concept to subsume and explain a plethora of positive analytic achievements. He noted that Lansky persuasively describes “the gradual analysis of powerful negative feelings, prompted by a felt sense of injury,” but does not show why a good outcome resulting from such analysis should be related to forgiveness per se.

Dictionary definitions of forgiveness were discussed with an emphasis on the fact that, most often, forgiveness is described not in terms of what it actively consists of but rather in terms of affects, such as resentment, which abate when an individual forgives. Moreover, dictionary definitions refer to a conscious process directed toward an external entity, leaving in question the unconscious roots of forgiveness – not to mention, the question of whether forgiveness is even possible on an unconscious level. Smith pointed out that Freud (1913) considered the idea of forgiving or loving one’s enemies to be an oxymoron and inferred that Freud regarded forgiveness as an exclusively conscious phenomenon. Smith noted that in “the unconscious” there is no forgiveness; there is only ambivalence, with love and hate co-existing side by side. This is consistent with Derrida, who

considered true or “unconditional” forgiveness to be an impossibility.

In psychoanalysis, Klein’s concept of reparation is the process most closely resembling that of forgiveness. In her writing, Klein is inconsistent regarding the distinction between the two as well as the distinction between the conscious and unconscious referents of reparation. Smith’s sense is that the unconscious process of reparation with internal objects may lead to the conscious experience of what we call forgiveness. However, the conflation of reparation with forgiveness tends to mix up different levels of psychic functioning and to confuse our understanding of all concepts involved. By reparation with internal objects, Klein is not referring to a superficial defensive process. However, forgiveness, Smith believes, does not refer to this reparative experience, but involves a compromise formation employing a wide variety of defensive and adaptive processes, each of which must be analyzed. “What we call forgiveness is part of an ongoing dynamic process that involves continuing input from both aggressive and erotic wishes in an ongoing effort to repair one’s relationship with internal objects and parts of oneself.” He believes that the aggressive component of forgiveness (including the sense of “understanding” and “pardoning” the victimizer) tends to be avoided when analysts feature its value.

Smith mentioned that some patients come to analysis in a state of denial or disavowal because of

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their extreme need to forgive those who have traumatized them. For some patients, the inclination to disavow and forgive may have become characterological, leading to dangerous lapses in judgment. In such cases, analysis may serve to replace the experience of forgiveness with a more realistic acceptance of the traumatic reality. Certainly, there are individuals who cling to feelings of resentment, but it is the analysis of this difficulty in the context of a specific individual's life that allows patients to move on. What we call forgiveness is thus an epiphenomenon that accompanies or follows – it does not precede – a newly gained internal sense of well being.

Smith cited a case from the literature (Siassi, 2004) in which the analyst argues for forgiveness as an integral element in analytic process. In this case, the patient's father died when he was an infant. His mother never openly acknowledged this to him. Moreover, she both exploited and was seductive to her son for many years. At the beginning of this man's analysis, he was equally unforgiving toward his mother and his father, who, he felt, had abandoned him. The analyst writes of how, in the course of the analysis, the patient gradually came to forgive and accept his losses. Smith stated that the analyst clearly demonstrates the patient's expansion of affect tolerance and the capacity to mourn; the patient gained in his ability to relinquish his defensive sense of grievance and rage. Smith raised the question, though, of whether such achievements constituted forgiveness or, rather, simply, acceptance. Moreover, Smith observed, the internal injuries inflicted by the parent who dies prematurely must differ from those inflicted by the parent who lives and treats her son abusively. Is it useful, he asked, to use the same word, "forgiveness," to describe the patient's coming to terms with

such radically different experiences? For that matter, would it even be desirable that this patient forgive the mother who, in his experience, deceived and manipulated him? Certain acts are unforgivable and can only be dealt with by acceptance and letting go. In line with this view, Smith suggested that certain comments by the patient, seen by the analyst as evidence of forgiveness, could be understood, instead, as defensive maneuvers, attempts to forgive the unforgivable by seeing the victimizer as victim. He noted how Siassi's commitment to the therapeutic value of forgiveness per se might be transmitted to the patient. He explored, as well, how the analyst's anger at, then subsequent empathy with, the patient – as cited in her account – might have involved not only the regaining of an empathic stance but simultaneously a defensive effort to manage her own annoyance. Did the patient pick up on this maneuver and mimic it in his own "forgiveness" of mother? To the extent that the analyst remains unaware of her own defensive use of empathy, the patient will be hindered in his ability to accept his own internal reality. Smith made it clear that he was speaking not only about this particular case, but about the ubiquity of such difficulties and of the mutual resistance of patient and analyst to analysis.

In relation to this case, Smith again argued against lumping together under the concept of forgiveness a wide variety of conflictual processes having to do with efforts at dealing with aggressive and erotic wishes and the fears evoked by these. The wholesale embracing of forgiveness, including forgiveness in the countertransference, can distract us from the analysis of these processes. He remarked that responses to his paper have often involved an objection to letting go of the value of forgiveness. The concept seems "so embedded in our culture, our thinking, and our

defensive structures that it seems almost impossible to do without it or delimit it."

Finally, Smith presented a case of his own, involving a man in a five times weekly analysis over a twenty year period. When this patient entered analysis, he believed that he had experienced an idyllic childhood. Gradually, he recalled efforts to please both his bullying father and his seductive mother. Affectively, he was able to remember the terror experienced with his unpredictable mother, in particular. As these memories returned, he began to experience intense anxiety, rather than blandness and dissociation, in the transference. As time went on, his capacity expanded for the experience of other affects, as well – sadness, but also pleasure and even love. His fear of genuine attachment toward another, as it plagued him in his current life, came to the fore. He acknowledged a positive, even frighteningly erotic, transference toward the analyst and began to report feeling "real" for the first time in his life.

The patient grew able to mourn the loss of the childhood he never had. Forgiveness, however, played no part in this process. Smith emphasized that to have asked him to forgive would have placed an intolerable burden on him. The patient did not forgive nor repair his relationships with his parents. However, he made major reparative work in his internal object world, including the internalization of the analyst as a good object. Consequently, his terror of his parents lessened. They became less important in his ongoing life and his resentment of them concurrently diminished as his relationships with others became more satisfying. Smith underscored that, while "my patient's letting go of resentment has the appearance of forgiveness, ... it is simply the outcome of a relatively successful analysis. My patient came... to accept his history, but

with full memory of what had happened and full awareness that what his parents had done and said was, for him, not forgivable. With memory and judgment intact, he could let go and move on."

Judy Kantrowitz, Training and Supervising Analyst at the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, was the first discussant. She suggested that forgiveness is not always possible or desirable: "Feeling shame is not always undesirable; just as being forgiving is not always desirable." To remain unforgiving toward Hitler, for instance, establishes a boundary between ourselves and him – one we do not wish to cross. She also echoed that it is necessary to distinguish between relationships in the external world and those in the internal object world, as well as between conscious and unconscious representations. She went on to emphasize that individuals internalize multiple aspects of interactions between themselves and significant others. In the case described by Smith, the patient consciously represented himself to his analyst as victim and his parents as victimizers. However, what ultimately enabled the therapy to progress was Smith's recognition of the patient's behavior toward him as victimizing, "the patient's expression of his previously disavowed, unconscious identification with his sadistic parents. The patient gradually came to see that the parents' abusive ways, while hated and feared, were aspects not only of the other, but also of himself." Kantrowitz understands the work with this patient, as described by Smith, to involve the process of forgiving himself for being ways that he could not and did not wish to forgive in his parents. Gradually, the patient gained the ability to own and contain his identification with his parents as the abuser and to forgive this aspect of himself – a process made possible by his gradual internalization of

the relationship between himself and Smith as benign. Even in cases of less severe abuse, individuals often develop harsh, overly critical superegos. Kantrowitz used the word "forgiveness" to describe the gradual diminution of self criticism and self hatred in such patients – as well as the diminution of their resentment toward others. "Forgiveness is a decathexis of the internal and externalized persecutory object... 'Moving on' refers to this separation from the internalized persecutory object and the sado-masochistic relationship." She also described forgiveness as a force facilitating the process by which patients 1) gain a fuller view of themselves and their parents and families 2) become less fearful of their own aggression and, thus, of the aggression of others and 3) grow to appreciate aspects of themselves that link them to their parents.

The second discussant, Howard Katz, Training and Supervising Analyst at the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, observed how deeply the concept of forgiveness is embedded in our historical, religious and philosophical traditions. He noted that a rigid tie tends to exist between the concepts of forgiveness and forgetting – and that forgetting, itself, tends to be understood too rigidly. Katz saw these as instances of the problem of definition, of establishing categories and contraries. He cited Nobel laureate physicist Niels Bohr's maxim "Contraria sunt complementa." "While our perceptions and language commonly parse the world into... opposite parts or qualities, these contrary entities might better be seen as complementary aspects or dimensions of a whole." Such complementarity has been discussed in a recent paper, "The complementary brain," by Steve Grossberg, who argues that complementary pairs of tendencies in brain activity seem opposite but work together. William James

compared consciousness to the flight of a bird, whose life journey alternates between "perchings and flights," which may relate to contemporary neurophysiologic studies.

Katz discussed forgetting/remembering as one such complementary pair, emphasizing that learning and "unlearning" is a unitary process. Learning could not take place without "forgetting." Memory itself involves, as Katz said, "retranscription or recontextualization." Freud's early idea of *Nachträglichkeit* involved this concept. In Siassi's case, described by Smith, the patient simultaneously "forgets" the image of his father as a failure and a disappointment and gains access to his hunger for the father who was not there because he had died. Katz saw forgetting and forgiving as, similarly, complementary, their evolution inextricably linked.

Clinically, the concept of forgiveness, rooted in the familiar myths and stories of grudge and revenge, may be useful "as one of a family of concepts that inform our efforts to understand and make contact [with patients]. Perhaps forgiveness can be useful in our work with certain patients, around particular dynamic themes, but only as a live, organic, connective concept, with inevitably indistinct borders from other concepts vitally important in our work."

In the discussion that followed, Busch posed the question: why has forgiveness become so prominent as a psychoanalytic concept? Smith responded that forgiveness is experienced as useful in fulfilling a defensive narcissistic need. It can serve as a "part object solution" to the experience of intense intrapsychic pain. Smith stated that the concept of forgiveness has also gained currency in the U.S. because of the increasingly Christian religious

climate of this country. When he presented this same paper in Europe, the audience was surprised at the popularity of the concept and the “moralizing” they felt it entailed. Speaking from the floor, a German woman stated that Germans feel a need to be forgiven for the Holocaust by Jews. For that matter, the younger generation of Germans are often asked by their grandparents: “why can you not forgive us?” She discussed the impossibility of granting forgiveness for crimes perpetrated upon others. Smith then discussed the transgenerational impact of extreme, unthinkable

trauma, how the effects will not quit, however much we might wish for their resolution.

Smith said he felt that both Kantrowitz and Katz, while agreeing with some aspects of his paper, had argued for maintaining the concept of forgiveness in our thinking, even refining the definition, thereby demonstrating how difficult it is to grapple with the idea of relinquishing it. Smith believes that forgiveness remains an overfluid concept, seeking to explain more than any one concept can. Perhaps, he suggested, what we think of as forgiveness

may be inherent in the tendency of an organism toward what is called “extinction” in neuroscience – that is, the tendency for painful affect states to dissipate or extinguish over time. However, as the term forgiveness is currently used in psychoanalytic discourse, it has no consistent meaning. Smith sees a greater utility in the concepts of acceptance and reconciliation – coming to terms with what has been and is and moving on from there. Indeed, even the goal of reconciliation may be unrealistic. Perhaps the best that hostile groups or individuals can hope for is co-existence.

Performed Forgiveness and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*

Smith’s paper (Smith, 2005) questions the usefulness of the concept of forgiveness in psychoanalytic work. I find his critique useful, as well, in the consideration of broader socio-political issues in South Africa. I am referring specifically to the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC). In this article, I aim to do two things. First, I wish to offer a critical review of the TRC’s function by speaking about its historical emergence in the South African context. Second, I would like to examine the function of “performed” forgiveness within the TRC drawing upon the logic I have distilled from Smith’s paper.

The South African TRC was profoundly ambitious, and seemed to embody the miracle of a relatively peaceful transition from apartheid rule to a democratic dispensation. It combined reconciliatory rhetoric with firmer jurisprudential mechanisms in an exquisite montage of justice, forgiveness, conditional criminal prosecution, investigative fervour, humanity, humaneness and human rights. It emerged out of a need to address the massive and systematic violations of human

rights that were incurred during the apartheid regime. The institutional mandate of the TRC was conceived in the last clause of the new constitution, which provided for the construction of a seventeen member commission to address the painful past of the country. It read as follows:

The adoption of this commission lays secure foundations for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu (the African philosophy of humanism) but not for victimization. (The South African Constitution of 1994 as quoted in *Country of my Skull*, Krog, A. 1998. Random House, p. vi.)

The historical emergence of the TRC began with the negotiated settlement between political powers that had reached a stalemate by 1990. The National Party, on the one hand, was unable to effect a victory over an increasingly militant resistance

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to the apartheid system. In addition to this, the backdrop of sanctions and a flailing economy rendered it impossible for the apartheid state to sustain its escalated oppression. The resistance movements, on the other hand, were unable to initiate a comprehensive revolution against the apartheid state. The reasons for this are varied and complex. However, two salient reasons are that the resistance movements could no longer rely on sustainable funding and unconditional political assistance from international supporters, and, that their leadership found themselves dispersed nationally, in exile and in apartheid jails. So, two enemies reluctantly turned to one another in an effort to forge their survival.

The resultant negotiated settlement had many far reaching consequences: First, there was an agreement to share power for the first five years of the transitional democracy, within a free-market framework. Second, minority rights were retained and white civil servants were allowed to retain their positions in the state bureaucratic structures. Third, amnesty was promised to all activists, politicians

and soldiers, with the proviso that full disclosures be made with regard to their contributions to gross human rights violations and atrocities. While these may have appeared costly political compromises at a manifest level, Marais (1998) notes that there were far more costly compromises made at the level of economic and social issues. According to Bundy (2000), the African National Congress (ANC) strategically retreated from addressing these issues in order to ensure that the “structural foundations of a two-nation” (p.11) society could be sustained through the transition from apartheid to democracy. This implied that no transitional democracy arrived at by a negotiated settlement could “afford” to foreground the issues of land and wealth redistribution. Thus, compromises had to be made for the sake of the country’s future.

Owing to the future-orientated strategies that had been employed in the transitional compromise, an ideology had to be promulgated that would best facilitate hope and optimism through the initial stages of democratization in an essentially unchanged South African socio-economic landscape. As Bundy (2000) states:

The ideology of the historic compromise dealt increasingly with the ‘new’ South Africa and nation building, the dominant discourse came to orbit around postulated common interests and destinies—rather than difference, contradiction and antagonism—as the fundamental dynamics at work in society (p. 12).

This ideology of national unity or “fantasmagoric harmony” eliding economic disparities (Stavrakakis, 1999) is captured by Tutu’s (1997) mythologized “rainbow nation.” Premised upon this compromised base, the TRC needed to promote nation building in a manner that served inadvertently (and at times advertently) as a smokescreen for the structural deficiencies of a less than ideal arrangement for the sharing of power. In the sense that this ideology needed to sustain the country through

its transition, the decision by the TRC to follow this path was both pragmatic and successful (Boraine, 2000, Villa-Vicencio, 2000). Villa-Vicencio (2000) states that the delay of a controversy served to:

[Keep] the polemical debate about the country’s past to a minimum to ensure that the nation is given a chance to confront the truth about the past in all its complexity (p. 26).

At what cost? If these strategies prevented the economic and social redress of apartheid inequalities by creating a “blind spot,” then the TRC contributed to deferring a potential revolution that could have addressed that which was elided in the negotiated settlement, namely, the trial and prosecution of those responsible for apartheid oppression, and the redistribution of wealth and land. What is more, for the majority of South Africans, the profoundly negative and aggressive affect around these issues remained unsymbolised¹. How was the TRC going to manage this potentially destructive surplus of aggressive affect, at least in the short-term? And how, in the actual proceedings of the TRC, was the obvious reality of an economically and socially unchanged environment to be backgrounded?

Forgiveness and the TRC

Drawing from the logic in Smith’s paper, I believe that the answer to this question is apparent in the TRC’s discursive preoccupation with forgiveness. I say ‘discursive preoccupation’ because nowhere in the constitutional mandate of the TRC is forgiveness highlighted. Forgiveness only emerged as a central mechanism of the TRC in its enactment, better yet, in its performance. The forgiveness that I am

¹ As I write this paper, I am painfully aware that South African society is one of the most violent in the world with alarmingly high proportions of murder, rape, child rape and other violent crime. In addition there is a disturbing (and also escalating) trend of sadism that characterises these crimes. I believe this trend to be in-part related to an unsymbolised rage in response to the structural violence of apartheid.

referring to is of a specific type. It was the forgiveness that was performed, “packaged” and sold in the official discourses and representations of the TRC. These representations occurred mainly in the media but by and large characterize all the discourses about the TRC outside of critical academia.

Forgiveness was the central preoccupation for media reporting about the work of the TRC (Simpson, 1999). As a nation we were distracted, captured and inspired by the images of former enemies embracing, of perpetrators washing the feet of their victims, of parents reaching out to the murderers of their children in virtually unimaginable gestures of forgiveness. In coverage and commentaries on the TRC, these spectacular moments served as anchoring points in the national and international imagination, bringing the New South Africa dramatically to life. This was radical forgiveness *in media res*.

As the TRC continued its work, participants and researchers began to take note of very different kinds of dynamics around forgiveness and reconciliation. It was noted that hearings were consistently directed towards being religiously redemptive by the commissioners (Krog, 1998; Wilson, 1999); and that testifiers were often left feeling upset, bewildered and that they had been used “expediently” (Kulumani Support Group, 1999). The TRC was shown to be shaping and constructing “truth” according to its own agendas, rather than discovering it (Chapman, 1999; van der Walt, 1999; Statman, 2000). I have shown in earlier work that victim testimonies that utilized discourses central to the TRC were longer and interrupted less than those that did not centre on the rhetoric of national politics, forgiveness and reconciliation (van der Walt, 1999). Statman (2000) notes of the TRC,

Regardless of the complexity of individual victims’ or perpetrators’ experiences and emotional responses, the

Continued on page 18

hearings encouraged, expected, shaped and rewarded expressions of forgiveness on the part of victims, remorse on the part of perpetrators and demonstrations of reconciliation between the two (p. 26).

In this sense forgiveness as it was performed and enacted had a specific agenda. That agenda, I believe, served the purpose of drawing our attention as South Africans away from that which divided us, made us hate, rendered us unequal and full of the desire for revenge.

In theoretical terms, the mechanism of performed forgiveness that was underscored by the TRC and its charismatic moral leader Archbishop Desmond Tutu, served as what I have called a "metonymic spectacle" (van der Walt, 2001). Drawing from Zizekian conceptions of the social (1993), and Lacanian Discourse Theory (Stavrakakis, 1994), the metonymic spectacle is a performance of an imagined utopia. Its conscious function is to soothe, reassure and comfort the onlooking subject who is interpolated by its coherence and desirability. Its unconscious function is to cryptically encode a traumatic "real" in such a way as to render it unrecognizable (and therefore tolerable) by the subject. Just as the metonym compresses and claims to represent a body of language in a single word or phrase, so too the metonymical spectacle claims to represent the work of the TRC in a single performance of forgiveness. If we as South African subjects are interpolated by the metonymical spectacle, we receive coherence in the rhetoric of forgiveness, nation building and the New South Africa. We also however lose sight of the "antagonism" (Bundy, 2000) that still fundamentally characterizes South African society today.

Concluding Comments

I am ambivalent about the TRC's performed forgiveness. Part of me understands this kind of forgiveness as a functional social mechanism/symptom observable in transitional democratic space. Its function is to negotiate a traumatic history

without taking recourse to war or violent revolution. However, the cost of retreating from social and economic realities in South Africa is painfully high. Crime and poverty (and the myriad of social ills that occur concomitantly) are symptoms that speak loudly in the social corpus of South Africa today. Yet what we have gained is also remarkable -- a relatively stable society governed by democratically elected leadership and guided by what many regard to be the most progressive constitution in the world.

I believe that the noble work of the TRC needs to be continued. There is much unfinished business when it comes to understanding and dealing with the traumatic impact of apartheid on all South Africans. In future articles, I will discuss some alternative models of social healing that take up from where the TRC left off. Specifically I will address the work of the Tswelopele Project (Tswelopele means "to move forward" or "to progress" in Tswana). This project worked with soldiers from both sides of the apartheid conflict in an attempt to heal and pursue the project of nation building in a manner very different from that of the TRC. The Tswelopele healing modalities resembled those of the consulting room more closely than the court room, and were decidedly more concerned with dealing with the trauma of the past than performatively forgiving it. This is not to say that discourses of forgiveness were absent between the participants; rather, that instances of conciliation and forgiveness were almost always secondary to the very messy process of understanding.

* Sections of this article have been adapted from Van der Walt, C., Franchi, V. & Stevens, G. (2003). The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 'Race', historical compromise and transitional democracy. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 27(2):251-267.

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Leaps of Faith: A Response to Clinton van der Walt

Henry F. Smith, M.D.

I am grateful to Clinton van der Walt for his understanding of my paper and for the bridge he has created to his own work on the South African TRC. His description of the TRC's process, its successes and failures, provides further evidence for the concerns I have had about the concept of forgiveness both clinically and in the world at large.

It is worth underscoring that not only was forgiveness *not* highlighted in the constitutional mandate of the TRC, as van der Walt points out, but the term *forgiveness* does not even appear in the 52 pages of the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which established the TRC. It was only when Desmond Tutu was appointed its first Chair that he promoted forgiveness as essential to the work of the TRC and thereby "christianised the language of an institution," as Derrida (2001, p. 42) put it.

Many social theorists take a dim view of the value of forgiveness in social conflict resolution, preferring the terms *reconciliation* or *acceptance*. The Harvard anthropologist Kimberly Theidon, for example, examining the aftermath of political violence in Peru (with its own Peruvian TRC), notes that, unlike forgiveness, *reconciliation* does not mean that people have to give up their "rancor. To reconcile also means to resign oneself to what is," Theidon (2008) writes, in the interest of achieving a more realistic goal of "co-existence" (Theidon, 2006, p. 100).

Van der Walt's argument is sophisticated in its appreciation of clinical process, and his observations are consistent with my own experience. I am thinking of his emphasis on the attempt to deal

with a "potentially destructive surplus of aggressive affect," for which the mechanism of forgiveness may be defensively promoted with predictably poor results. I am also struck by his emphasis on the performative aspects of forgiveness and his use of the Lacanian concept of the "metonymic spectacle," in which a single act--and the imagined utopia it might bring -- substitutes for the much more difficult process of dealing systematically with past trauma and leaves the underlying aggression unmodified.

These are characteristics, I find, of psychoanalyses and psychotherapies in which forgiveness is touted as essential to the process. In both the social situation and the clinical one, the process of forgiveness seems to entail a denial or disavowal of painful realities, as if it were possible to say "it never happened," as in "all is forgiven." The performative nature of the act bypasses the reality of the trauma itself and the work of reconciling oneself to one's history.

If we compare forgiveness to the attention in Judaism to atonement, with its detailed consideration of what needs to be done to atone for wrongs committed, the Christian emphasis on forgiveness appears to be an enactment of the leap of faith that Kierkegaard described, a leap over logic to religious belief, as he saw it. I do not mean to reduce Christian theology to psychological mechanisms, but in the clinical situation, as I have tried to demonstrate, the invoking of forgiveness appears frequently as a psychic compromise, a leap of fantasy, of wish, and of defense -- a leap over reason. In making such a leap, one short-circuits the work that needs to be done, the "messy process of understanding," as van

der Walt calls it, whether it is in the South African townships, or on the analytic couch.

I remain fascinated by how resistant we are to questioning the concept of forgiveness and how adhesive it is in our thinking. I believe it is because the work of accepting the reality of the traumas we have suffered, and which we have caused others to suffer, is so difficult and so fraught with failure that we embrace the promise that forgiveness will heal our pain, rage, and guilt. The leap of forgiveness is a solution that has become embedded in our psychic lives. Think of it as the christianizing of a culture and its thought processes.

We are all subject to leaps of faith in one psychological form or another, but it is useful to know what we may be bypassing -- and what the consequences of doing so may be -- when we practice such leaps or when we proselytize for them in psychoanalysis or in social conflict resolution. Otherwise, it seems to me, it is best to consider that while to err is human, to forgive is indeed divine -- that is, best left to the gods.

My thanks to Clinton VanderWalt for extending my understanding of the concept of forgiveness and its hazards.

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“On the Death Instinct and Creativity”

A Presentation by Paul Schwaber, Ph.D.

Sarah Ackerman, Ph.D.

On May 21, the PINE Faculty was fortunate to have the opportunity to hear and discuss Paul Schwaber’s paper in progress, “On the Death Instinct and Creativity.” Professor of Letters at Wesleyan University and a practicing psychoanalyst, Dr. Schwaber has published extensively on the relations of imaginative literature and psychoanalysis. The paper read to our faculty addressed ideas pertaining to Freud’s theoretical development of the death instinct. Schwaber suggested that a precursor of Freud’s thinking in this area can be found in his intellectual responses to the horrors of World War One, poignantly captured in “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.” Schwaber’s paper explored the idea that there might be an essential relationship between the death instinct and creativity, that in creating something new it might be essential to disassemble old ideas, beliefs, or products.

Schwaber pointed to Freud’s style of building the death instinct onto his preexisting theory as perhaps emblematic of this creative utilization of the death drive. The close relationship between destruction and creativity was further explored through a close reading of Molly Bloom’s reverie in James Joyce’s *Ulysses* and through an analysis of Yeats’ sonnet, “Leda and the Swan.” Schwaber underscored the mix of aggressive, destructive thoughts punctuated by affirmation (“yes!”) that runs through Molly Bloom’s mind as

she reflects on her sexual dalliance with Blazes Boylan and comes around to the resolution to give her husband, Leopold Bloom, another try. In the discussion following the paper, it was observed that Joyce both destroyed and transformed Homer’s Odysseus and Virgil’s Ulysses through his creation of Leopold Bloom. Further, Schwaber was revising or reassembling the narrative thread of Freud’s theoretical ideas in order to draw out something new.

Unmentioned, but certainly relevant, are the resonances between Freud’s writing during World War One and the current political atmosphere five years into the Iraq war and our so-called global War on Terror. Questions concerning the role of aggression in the individual psyche and the role of aggression in our theory of mind seem to press upon us now, just as they did for Freud when he saw civilization falter in the Great War. It is interesting to consider how cultural events that have shaped the past seven years must have played a latent role in motivating Schwaber’s concerns, just as the enormous destructiveness in Europe altered the course of Freud’s thoughts.

The PINE discussion was centered primarily on the concept of the death drive, in contrast to concerns about the creative process. Some argued forcefully against the construct of a death instinct, claiming that it doesn’t add anything to our theory or that it is problematic to posit an active

drive toward ultimate inactivity. Others supported the utility of the death drive in reaching into an understanding of the deadness and blighted repetitions that we can recognize so easily both within individual treatments (libidinal attachments to miserable, neurotic repetitions) and on a larger social and political scale.

Behind this fascinating and deeply engaging conversation may lie questions concerning the condition of psychoanalysis today. It was extremely satisfying that a faculty meeting was so well attended and by faculty of every level of seniority. However, I also wondered how the topic might have offered an opportunity for a conversation in displacement about the problems pressing on psychoanalysis today—how to manage the destructive forces within the institutionalization of psychoanalysis and how to renew our analytic commitment to the healthiest and most positive facets of psychoanalysis.



ANNOUNCEMENTS

It is with great pleasure that we announce the graduation of **Gail Doherty, LICSW, Simona Grabel, Ph.D.,** and **Diane Pearlman, LICSW,** from Full Training at the Psychoanalytic Institute of New England, East.

NEWS & NOTES

Sally Ackerman, Ph.D. was the moderator of a panel entitled "Why Psychoanalysis?" for the Psychoanalytic Educational Forum of Boston (PEFB) on January 23, 2008. She is co-chair of the Psychoanalytic Study Group, sponsored by the Leslie Center for the Humanities at Dartmouth College. On April 2, the study group had its first meeting. Humphrey Morris, M.D. presented "Reading Late Freud: 'Constructions in Analysis; and the Enactment of the Disavowed,'" and Dr. Ackerman served as the discussant.

Fred Busch, Ph.D. presented "Can You Push a Camel through the Eye of a Needle: Reflections on Unconscious Communications in Psychoanalysis" as an invited paper and clinical workshop for faculty of the Baltimore-Washington Psychoanalytic Institute in February of 2008. In March of 2008, Dr. Busch was invited to present "Evaporating Technique: Technical Innovations in Danger of Disappearing" to the European Psychoanalytic Federation in Vienna, Austria. He presented the David Black Memorial Lecture with a paper entitled "An Invitation to a Conversation Like No Other" at the Milwaukee Psychoanalytic Society in April of 2008.

M. Robert Gardner, M.D. has an exhibit of new watercolors entitled "Near and Far" at The Sacramento St Gallery, Cambridge, from June 8 – July 26, 2008.

Gary N. Goldsmith, M.D. gave a report to the Berlin Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in July of 2007 on "Psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe" which is posted at

www.internationalpsychoanalysis.net. He will give a paper entitled "The Therapeutic Setting in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy" at the 15th East European Psychoanalytic Summer School in Odessa, Ukraine, on June 8, 2008.

Axel Hoffer, M.D. was a discussant of a presentation by Mardi Horowitz, M.D., entitled "Value Re-prioritization in Psychoanalysis" at the winter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in January of 2008.

Good, M.I. (2008) Vitamin D verdict inconclusive [Letter ed.] *Boston Globe*, February 6.

Jacqueline Olds, M.D. and Richard Schwartz, M.D. just finished a book titled *The Lonely American* which will be published by Beacon Press in February of 2009.

Kenneth I. Reich, Ed.D., presented a Workshop on SOFAR at the Winter Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in January of 2008 in New York. He gave a lecture on SOFAR to the Aerospace Nursing Society at the 79th Annual Scientific Meeting of the Aerospace Medical Association in Boston in 2008. Dr. Reich gave a lecture entitled "Invisible Casualties of War" as part of the discussion for the film "Ground Truth" at the Western Massachusetts and Albany Association for Psychoanalytic Psychology at the Austin Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts in 2008. As well, in 2008, Dr. Reich received the Paul Myerson Award from the Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis in 2008 for co-founding the Psychoanalytic

Couple and Family Institute of New England and the Strategic Outreach to Families of All Reservists.

BOOK REVIEW

Wolk, P. (2008) Review of *In Search of Memory* by E.R. Kandel. *Psychoanal. Quart.*, In press. An earlier version of this review was published in volume 19, number 3, Summer 2007, issue of the PINE/PSNE Newsletter.

OMISSION

Astrid Berg's article "The Inner and Outer Journey in Establishing an Infant Mental Health Service in a Community in Cape Town, South Africa," was published in the last issue of the PINE/PSNE Newsletter. Dr. Berg's biography, which follows, was mistakenly omitted.

Astrid Berg is a psychiatrist, Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist as well as a Jungian Analyst. She is an Associate Professor at the University of Cape Town and a senior consultant in the Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the Red Cross Children's Hospital in Cape Town where she heads the Infant Mental Health Unit. She is a founding member and past President of the Southern African Association of Jungian Analysts. She has been Vice President of the International Association of Analytical Psychology and was the Chair of the Local Organizing Committee for the XVIIth IAAP Congress in Cape Town.

PINE/PSNE EXTENSION DIVISION

SEMINARS IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR CLINICIANS

2008-2009

SYLLABUS

The PINE/PSNE Extension Division course is a series of seminars which combine didactic and a clinical focus. They are taught by recognized PINE faculty and candidates in the spirit of collaborative inquiry that characterizes PINE. The course is designed to meet the needs of all graduate clinicians who have been exposed to psychoanalytic thinking and who wish to deepen their understanding of psychoanalytic concepts but who may not be ready to apply for full training. The year-long format provides immersion in a working group that will also play an important role in continuing professional development. All teaching will be clinically based and is designed to integrate traditional and contemporary psychoanalytic thinking with current clinical practice.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

The goal of the course is that participants will develop a more full understanding of analytic theory and an appreciation of the various applications of psychoanalytic concepts in practice today.

TIME and PLACE

Monday evenings, 7:30 – 9:30 p.m.
September 15, 2008 – April 27, 2009

Most sessions will be held at 186 Waban Avenue, Waban, Massachusetts. Some instructors in Needham or Brookline may choose to hold the sessions in their offices.

This course presents both a deepening introduction and furthering of understanding to those familiar with psychoanalytic ideas, using both classical and contemporary readings. Each topic will be covered over a series of three to four weeks, integrating readings and clinical material and class discussion. In all the segments, active reading and participation is central to the learning experience, and questioning is as important as knowing.

Topic: Foundations of
Psychoanalysis
Faculty: Karen Weisgerber, Ph.D.
Dates: September 15, 22, 29, 2008

Topic: Therapeutic Action
Faculty: Julia Matthews, Ph.D., M.D.
Dates: October 6, 20;
November 3, 10, 2008

Topic: Introduction to the
Unconscious
Faculty: Sarah Ackerman, Ph.D.
Dates: November 17, 24;
December 1, 2008

Topic: Transference/
Countertransference
Faculty: Diane Pearlman, LICSW/
Linda Shaw, Psy.D.
Dates: December 8, 15, 2008;
January 5, 12, 2009

Topic: Dreams
Faculty: Robert F. Kenerson, M.D.
Dates: January 26;
February 2, 9, 23, 2009

Topic: Working with Difficult
Patients
Faculty: Michael Dvorkin, Ed.D.
Dates: March 2, 9, 16, 2009

Topic: Psychoanalysis and
Mourning
Faculty: Frances Lang, LICSW/
Catherine Loula, M.D.
Dates: March 23, 30; April 6, 2009

Topic: The Relevance of
Psychoanalysis for
Contemporary Practice
Faculty: Karen Weisgerber, Ph.D.
Jane Kite, Ph.D.
Dates: April 13, 27, 2009

APPLICATION INFORMATION

Eligibility: These courses are designed for psychodynamically oriented licensed and license eligible clinicians, who may be either currently engaged in or post clinical training. Registration is for the entire sequence of seminars in the Extension Division.

Fees and Payment Policies: The Extension Division fee is \$1250 with a non-refundable deposit of \$50 due with the application to secure enrollment. The remaining \$1200 due by September 8. Enrollment will be accepted through August on a first come first serve basis.

For further information, please call the PINE/PSNE administrative office at 781-449-8365 or e-mail office@pineanalysis.org or contact Karen Weisgerber, Ph.D. at 617-630-1919.

PINE/PSNE has a new website, pineanalysis.org, constructed by Tami Margolis of Visual Momentum. It links us with the internet, major search engines, and contains an internal site for our members as well. Committees, events, and notices can be updated by sending information to the office. Please use this rich resource for communication and keep us posted on further updates you think are useful.

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NEWSLETTER

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